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ABSTRACT
In the presence of aggregate demand spillovers, an imper-
fectly competitive firm's profit is positively related to
aggregate income, which in turn rises with profits of all firms
in the economy. This pecuniary externality makes a dollar of a
firm's profit raise aggregate income by more than a dollar, since
other firms' profits also rise, and in this way gives rise to a
'multiplier." Since such "multipliers' are ignored by firms
making investment decisions, privately optimal investment choices
under uncertainty will not in general be socially optimal. Under
reasonable conditions, private investment is too low.
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This paper analyzes investment decisions in thepresence of
macroeconomic externalities. Following the work ofCooper and John (1985)
and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1985),1 westudy a model with aggregate demand
spillovers, where a firm's profit is positively related
to aggregate income,
which in turn rises with profits of all firms inthe economy. This
externality makes a dollar of a firm's profit raiseaggregate income by more
than a dollar, since other firms' profits alsorise, and similarly a dollar
of a firm's loss reduce income by more thana dollar. Equivalently, there is
a "multiplier" on a firm's profit (or loss) in thedetermination of aggregate
income. Moreover, such multipliersvary across states of nature, depending
on how many other firms benefit from a firm'sprofit (or lose from its loss)
in each state. Because firms ignore thisvariation of multipliers across
states in making investment decisions, profitmaximizing choices need not be
socially optimal.
To set up a benchmark for evaluating economieswith imperfectly informed
firms, Section 2 presents a full informationeconomy. In the model, each
sector has a potential monopolist with access toa cost reduction technology.
Each monopolist must decide whether to investand obtain a low marginal cost
or leave the market to a competitive fringe that hasa higher marginal cost.
The profit-maximizing choice depends onexpected demand, since only in a
large enough market can an investment in unit cost reduction breakeven.
Demand, in turn, depends on profits of othersectors, since profits are
distributed to the consumer and spent by him.Aggregate demand spillovers
1Also relatedare papers by Diamond (1982), Hart (1982), Weitzman
(1982), Heller (1985), Shielfer (1986) and Mankiw (1986).-2-
through the distribution of profits make firms interested in the productive
potentials of firms in other sectors of the economy.
In Section 2, the realized distribution of cost reduction technologies
across sectors is publicly known. This knowledge enables each potential
monopolist to compute the profits of potential monopolists in other sectors
and in this way to forecast aggregate profits and demand. He can then gauge
the size of his own market and make an accurate investment decision. In the
benchmark case of perfect information, the economy has a unique perfect
foresight equilibrium in which investment decisions are efficient. In other
words, a perfectly informed planner would have each firm make the same
investment decision as it does in the free market equilibrium.
In contrast, Section 3 presents the same economy, except now firms have
imperfect knowledge about cost reduction opportunities of other sectors.
Firms then have to make forecasts of aggregate demand based on their priors
as well as observation of their own technological opportunities. In this
case, rational expectations equilibria exist, but are not, in general, unique
or efficient. The sources of inefficiency are twofold. The first is the
inability of firms to accurately condition their investment choices on
circumstances of other sectors, since decisions must be made on the basis of
imperfect information. Miequallywell-informed social planner would face
the same difficulty.
The second source of inefficiency stems from the divergence of prof it-
maximizing and constrained welfare-maximizing investment decisions in the
presence of aggregate demand spillovers. A firm's losses (profits)have an
adverse (beneficial) impact on profits of other firms, and the firm ignores
this impact in making investment decisions. Interestingly, this externality-3-
has no adverse welfare consequences in thecertainty model of Section 2.
This is because there a firm has a positivespillover effect on other firms
if and only if it makes a positive profitby investing. In the uncertainty
case, in contrast, it is not the case that when a firm's profitaverages to
zero across states, its spillover effect alsoaverages to zero.
To see this, consider a marginal firm thatexpects to break even on
average if it invests. When the state of the world turns out to begood,
many other firms are investing in cost reduction and the marginal firm's
positive profit raises profits in all these sectors,giving its profits a
high multiplier in the generation of aggregate income. When thestate of the
world turns out to be bad, only a few firmsare investing in cost reduction,
and the loss by the marginal firm spillsover onto the profits of only a few
firms, making the multiplier on that loss small.Overall, even though the
marginal firm expects on average to break even, the impact of itsdecision to
invest on expected aggregate income isstrictly positive. In this way,
uncertainty about the productive potential of theeconomy in the presence of
aggregate demand spillovers gives rise to systematic underinvestiient.
2. The Full InformationEconomy
Thebenchmark economy described inthis section sets the stagefor the
subsequentanalysis. Itshares with the models to follow theassumptions
aboutpreferences, technology, and markets, but uses a particularlysimple
information structure.
Consider a one period economy with a representativeconsumer, who has
Cobb-Douglas preferences defined over a unit interval of goods. Allgoods
have the same expenditure shares. Thus, when his incomeis y, the consumer
can be thought of as spending y on every commodity. Theconsumer is endowed-4-
with L units of labor, which he supplies inelastically, and he ownsall the
profits of this economy. Taking his wage as numeraire,his budget constraint
is given by:
(1) y-.II+L,
where II is aggregate profits.
Each good is produced in its own sector, and each sector consists of two
types of firms. First, each sector has a competitive fringeof firms which
convert one unit of labor input into one unit of output with a constant
I
returnsto scale technology. In addition, each sector has a uniquefirm that
has access to a cost reduction technology. This firm is alone in having
access to that technology in its sector, and hence willbe referred to as a
monopolist (even though, as we specify below, it does not always operate).
Cost reduction requires the input of F units of labor (required outlay) where
F is drawn from the economy-wide distribution H(F) and allows each unit of
labor to produce a > 1 units of output. In this section, it is publicly
known that H(F) is the realized distribution of required outlays across
sectors. Much of this paper examines the consequences of uncertainty about
the realized distribution H.
The monopolist in each sector decides whether to become a low cost firm
or to abstain from production altogether. He reduces his costs (Minvestsw)
only if he can earn a profit. The price he charges if he produces equals
unity, since he loses all his sales to the fringe if he charges more,and he
would not want to charge less when facing a unit elastic demand curve. When
income is y, the profit of a monopolist who spends F to reduce costs is:
(2).5-
The monopolist invests as long asy ￿F/a.It is obvious from this that, in
equilibrium, assuming all firms expect the sameaggregate income, if a firm
with required outlay F invests, then all firms withrequired outlays less
than F also invest. We assume that a•L-F >0,where F is the lover
- win win
end of the support of H; that is, it alwayspays the best cost reducer to
invest.
A perfect foresight equilibrium in thiseconomy is given by the marginal
firm with required outlay F* and income y(F*) suchthat (a) income y(F*)
obtains when all firms with requiredoutlays no greater than F* invest, and
(b) the marginal firm breaks even, i.e.,
(3) ay(F*) -F*—0.
When all firms with required outlays nogreater than F* invest, then
aggregate profits are given by:
* *
* F * * * F
(4) II(F)— f[ay(F)- F]dH(F)—ay(F)H(F )- fFdH(F). F F win win







Equilibriumobtains at F* if (3) holds for income given by (5).
The numerator of expression (5) is the amount of labor usedin the
economy for actual production of output, after investment outlays. One over
the denominator is the multiplier thatrecognizes that an increase in-6-
effective labor raises income by more than one for one,since expansion of
low cost sectors also raises profits. To see this more explicitly,one can
calculate that:
* **
'6'dy(F ),r(F)dH(F ) 'I * *
dF l-all(F )
where,r(F*) is the profit of the marginal firm. When the marginal firm earns
this profit, it distributes it to shareholders, who in turn spendit on all
goods and thus raise profits of all cost reducingfirms in the economy. The
effect of the marginal firm's profit is therefore enhanced bythe increases
in profits of all cost reducing firms resulting fromincreased spending.
Since there are H(F*) of such firms, the multiplier is increasingin the
number of firms that benefit from the spillover of the marginalfirm. The
more firms invest, the greater is the cumulativeincrease in profits and
therefore income resulting from a positive NPV investment by a marginalfirm.
For an alternative interpretation of (6), notice that sincethe price of
labor is unity, the profit of the marginal firm,,r(F*), is exactly equal to
the net labor saved from its investment in cost reduction. The numeratorof
(6) is therefore the increase in labor available tothe economy as a result
of the investment by the F*firm in the cost reduction technology.In
equilibrium, this freed up labor moves into all sectors.However, its
marginal product is higher in investing sectorsthan in non-investing
sectors. The more sectors investing in cost reduction (i.e.,the higher is
the greater is the increase in total output resulting fromthe inflow
of freed up labor into these sectors. In fact, the denominatorof (6) is
just the average of marginal labor costs across sectors,which is clearly a-7-
decreasing function of H(F*). This interpretation connects (6) to(5), which
explicitly states that income is a multiple of productive labor, andthat the
multiplier is increasing in H(F*).
ProDositign 1: The equilibrium exists and isunique. The numberoffiring
investing in cost reduction is efficient at the given prices.
Proof:
Notation: Denote by ,r(FJF* —F)the profit of the firmwith required
outlay F when only the firms with required outlays nogreater than F invest.
Call the investing firm with the highestrequired outlay the marginal firm.
(a) Existence: Note that ,r(FIF* —F) —aL-F> 0. Either mm mm mm
,r(FIF* —F)0, in which case every firm investing is an equilibrium,
or (F IF* —F) < 0, in which case there exists an F such that max max
,r(FIF* —F)—0by the intermediate value theorem.
(b) Uniqueness: Investment by a firm making anegative profit reduces
aggregate income. Take an equilibrium with marginal firm F*. Now raise the
number of investing firms in order of themagnitude of their required
outlays, starting with those just above F*. Since F* firms breakeven at the
initial equilibrium, firms with F> F' losemoney. Adding them can only
reduce aggregate income, making investments by each additionalfirm even more
unprofitable. To find another equilibrium, however, income must beraised so
that a new marginal firm, with requiredoutlay F > F* can break even.
Since adding investing firms with required outlays above F*only reduces
income, this is impossible.
(c) Efficiency: Mi investing firm adds toaggregate income (and therefore,
at constant prices, to welfare) if and only if the firm'sprofits are-8-
positive. Consider an thvestxnent rule in which some (possibly empty)subset
of firms with F <F*do not invest and some (possibly empty) subset with
F >F*do invest. Since all those with F <F*are making a positive profit
in the F* equilibrium, eliminating any of them only decreases income. Now
consider adding some firms with F >F* in ascending order of their F's.
Since income is no higher after eliminating some subset of firms with F <F*,
the lowest F >F*firms will make a negative profit from investing. This
further decreases income, making investment by firms with higher F's even
more unprofitable.
The efficiency result deserves a comment. According to expression (6),
a firm's spillover is positive if and only if its own profits are positive.
Therefore, even though a firm deciding whether or not to reduce its unit cost
ignores the spillover, it decides to do so only when the social plannerwould
choose likewise. The multiplier only changes the magnitude of the effect of
a firm's investment on income, and not the sign. Under certainty, both
second-best (constrained by monopoly pricing) welfare maximization and profit
maximization dictate that an investment be undertaken if and only if it earns
a positive profit. In the rest of the paper, we show that, under
uncertainty, this need not be the case. Specifically, if a firm's profit
across states averages to zero, its average spillover effect on otherfirms
is in general positive.
3. The Incomvjete Information Nodel
Suppose now that there are two states of the world, characterized by
different distributions of required outlays across sectors. In the good
state, the distribution is C(F), in the bad state, it is B(F).Assume that-9-
the densities g(F) and b(F) are strictly positive and continuouson
[FmiiF] and that the likelihood ratio b(F)/g(F) is strictly increasing in
F on that interval. That is, the relative likelihood of a higher fixedcost
is higher in the bad state. This implies, in particular, that C(F) >B(F)
for all F in (F ,F ). mmmax
The probability that the state is good is denoted byp; it is a common
prior of all market participants. In this section, each potential monopolist
also observes his own required outlay F, but does not know which state is
realized. For this reason, he must form a posterior belief, q(F), that the
state is good:
(7) (F) pg(F) q
pg(F) + (l-p)b(F)
Because the likelihood ratio b(F)/g(F) is assumed to be increasing in F,q(F)
is decreasing in F for any prior p. The higher is the requiredoutlay that a
firm draws, the lover is the probability it attaches to the outcome ofa good
state.
When a firm conjectures that income is
Yg
in the good state, and in
the bad state, it invests provided
(8) aL4(r)Yg + (lq(F))y] -F￿: 0.
Because profits in each state are linear in income, all that a firm cares
about in its investment decision is the average level of income itexpects.
A rational expectations equilibrium is defined as a cutoff required
outlay F* of the marginal firm, and incomes in the good and bad state yg(F*)
and yb(F*) given by (5) using G(F) and B(F) respectively, such that the
marginal firm expects to break even. To a firm with required outlay F,
expected income is:- 10-
(9)Ye(F) —q(F)yg(F*)
+(q(F))y(F*).
Since q(F) is decreasing in F, Ye(F) is decreasing in F, and therefore firms
with required outlays below F* always prefer to invest whenever the marginal
firm expects to break even. In equilibrium, all agents agree onF*, and
hence on incomes in the two states, but disagree on their relative
likelihoods. The marginal firmmustexpect to break even using its own
assessmentof the probability that the state is good.
Provosition 2; Under incomplete information, there always exists at least
one equilibrium. As long as not all firms invest in equilibrium,investment
by some group of firms with required outlays aboveF* raises expected income.
If there are multiple equilibria, the equilibrium with the highestF* is
Pareto preferred to the others.
Proof:
(a) Existence: Consider the function E[,r(FIF* —F)]under the assumption
that E(,r(FjIF* —Fmjn)]>0and apply the intermediate value theorem.
(b) Underinvestment: We show that, for any equilibrium cutoff levelF*,
there exists an c >0such that investment by the firms in the interval
**






Note that pg(F*)wg(F*) +(lp)b(F*)1rb(F
)— 0.However, G(F*) >B(F*)and
since lrg(F*) >0and frb(F*) < 0, we conclude thatdE(y)(— 0)>0- 11-
(c)Pareto Ranking of Equilibria: Let F and F be thecutoff levels for
two different equilibria with F < F. LetE(y) be the difference of











wheregood(F) and bd(F) are based on investment by all firms with required
outlays less than F. But we must have that
* *
F2 F2
1* good' +(l-p)fbad > 0 or else the firms between
F1
F and F would not be investing in the Fequilibrium. Since profits are
positive in the good state and G(F) > B(F), it follows thatAE(y) is
positive.
The logic of the underinvestment result warrantssome elaboration.
Since more firms invest in the good state, thepositive profit that the
marginal firm earns in that state spills over onto moreinvesting firms than
does the negative profit in the bad state. Putdifferently, the multiplier
on the marginal firm's profit is higher in the good state. Asa result, even
when the marginal firms expect to earnzero, the expected change in income
from investing is positive.- 12-
Alternatively,consider the interpretation with change in productive
labor. In the good state, the labor that is freed up and spread around as a
result of the investment by the marginal firm goes to a large extent into the
already investing sectors, where the marginal product of thatlabor is high.
In this state, a fraction G(F*) of that labor has high productivity. In the
bad state, when productive labor is withdrawn from the economy as a result of
investment by the marginal firm, only B(F*) of the sectors have invested to
get high productivity. In other words, the labor released bythe marginal
firm in the good state is more productive than the labor absorbed by it in
the bad state.
The difference between productivity of labor across states is not
internalized by investing firms, however. Recall that an investing firm's
profit is equal to the expected amount saved on its sector's wage bill from
switching to the low marginal cost technology (at an initial cost of F)
instead of leaving production to the fringe. But the value to the economy of
the labor saved is equal to the wage payments to that labor D].us the profit
that labor produces elsewhere. In our model, the wage is constant and only
the profit component of the value of labor saved varies across states. Firms
ignore variation in this profit component when making their investment
decisions. Since there are more sectors using labor to produce profits in
good times, the profit of the marginal firm understates the true value of
labor saved in good times more than it understates the value of extra labor
used in bad times. On average, investment by a firm with zero expected
profit raises the productive labor available to the economy, and is therefore
preferred by the planner.- 13-
Theunderinvestaent result is a consequence of imperfect competitionand
aggregate demand spillovers in this economy, since we have made sure that the
beliefs of the planner and of the marginal firm are thesame. Ignorance
about the state of nature is not, therefore, theonly source of investment
inefficiency in this model, since the equally well-informed planner would
have more firms investing.
The underinvestaent property of the model naturally leads toa
multiplicity of equilibria in many cases. Multiplicity arises in the model
when there is a group of marginal firms whose members makepositive profits
from investing if and only if (at least some) other members of thegroup
invest. This situation occurs for a wide set ofparameters, primarily
because of the underinvestment property of the model.
Suppose we are at an equilibrium in which all firms having required
outlays below F* invest. A firm with required outlay F* +£ willmake a
small negative profit if it invests by itself. On the otherhand, if an
entire interval of firms with required outlays slightly above F*invests,
they will have a potentially large positive effect onaverage income,
possibly making the decision to invest profitable for all firms in that
Interval. This would mean that there must be another equilibrium in which
these firms invest. Hence, the property of the model that investmentby a
group of marginal firms raises income can be seen to lead to the existence of
multiple equilibria.
Because this bootstrapping property relies on having different
multipliers across states (and higher multipliers in good states), it iseasy
to see why we cannot get multiple equilibria in the one-period certainty
model. But one could get the underInvestment property and the existence of
multiple equilibria even in a world of certainty if Investments generated- 14-
morethan one period of cash flows. In deciding whether or not to invest,
firms would look at a discounted sum of cash flows, whilethe social planner
would look at the same sum except with each period's cash flow weighted by
the aggregate income multiplier for that period. Profit-maximizingfirms
would ignore variation in these multipliers across periods and might
underinvest (overinvest) if their highest profits occurred inthe periods
when their spillover effects were largest (smallest).
One interesting application of the idea of inefficient investmentdue to
variation of aggregate income multipliers over time is to rapidly developing
economies. Suppose that to industrialize a sector the monopolist mustincur
the cost of a modern plant today but reaps the profits in future periods.
His investment therefore absorbs current labor and releases futurelabor. If
the economy is progressing, then it is probable that today's labor has less
productive alternative uses than does future labor. Butif productivity
gains are mostly confined to a subset of imperfectly competitiveindustries,
those gains may not be reflected in either lower prices or higher wages.
This means that a larger portion of the value of future labor saved from
investing in a modern plant than of current labor used tobuild it is
accounted for by the profits of other sectors which the monopolist does not
internalize. As a result, the monopolist's profitability calculation would
place a lower relative value on future labor than would asocial planner's.
He might therefore choose not to invest even though it is socially optimal
for him to do so. We conjecture that the internally generated levelof
investment in a rapidly developing economy characterized by rising aggregate
income multipliers (profit spillovers) will be too low relative tothe
constrained optimum (that is, constrained by monopoly pricing in cost
reducing sectors).- 15
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